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it is not for me to speculate; but I may express my
humble opinion that our intervention in the 'var upon
the invasion of Belgium in defense of treaty obligations,
against the breach of such obligations by the invaders,
'vas a complete surprise even to their Government.
Documents and facts 'vhich throw light upon the
history of the days I have been dealing 'vith between
July 24 and August 4, 1914, are, I think, admirably
collected and stated in a -vvork called the liistory of
T\velve Days, by Mr. J. W. Headlam.
On the grounds that the German vendors had no
thought of the imminence of war between Germany and
this country, and did not have such a war in contemplation at any time while the transactions of sale were taking
place or before they were completed, I hold that the
sales to the t'vo Dutch merchants were valid, and that
the goods were not confiscable. And I decree the release
to then1 respectively of the net proceeds of the sale of
their respective goods, 'vhich are now in court.

Decision .

THE " GLITRA."
July 30, 1915.
1 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts, 34.

In the prize matter concerning the English steamer
Glitra, with Leith as her home port, the imperial superior
prize court in Berlin, at its sitting of July 30, 1916, has
found as follows:
Decision.

The appeals lodged by the plaintiffs under Nos. 9 to 12 of the decision
are rejected as inadmissible; the appeals of the remaining plaintiffs
are denied as unfounded.
The costs of the proceedings in appeal are to be borne by the plaintiffs.
REASONS.

On October 20, 1914, the steamer Glitra, belonging to
the firm of Salversent & Co., of Leith, with a general
cargo on the vvay from Leith to Stavanger, was brought
to by a submarine, and after the cre'v had left the ship
she "\Vas sunk, together with her cargo.
re~~~ti~~s. prize
In answer to the summons of the prize court issued in
accordance 'vith section 26 of the prize court regulations,
the 13 parties interested in the cargo submitted claims
for compensation for damages due to the destruction of
their merchandise. The plaintiffs are members of Nor'vegian firms; the plain tiff figuring in claim No. 2 alone .
Statement

thecase.
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is a Danish insurance company 'vhich presents the claims
of its Norwegian policyholders.
The prize court has found that the ship which 'vas
sunk was subject to seizure and has denied the clahn.
The appeal lodged against this decision is not 'vell
founded.
The prize court has· ' in the first place ' impartially necessary.
Destruction
established that the Glitra was an English ship, and that,
given the circun1stances of the case, the destruction of the
ship was necessary, in order to insure the capture. The
prize court did not concern itself ~with the question as to
whether or not the merchandise, on account of which
claims for compensation 'vere submitted, "\Vas neutral
merchandise, because it came to the conclusion that even
if such had been the case there would be no cause for a
claim to compensation for damages. In justification of
this conclusion it was stated that the question thus brought
up had not been decided either in the prize regulations or
in any international treaties, and, especially, it had not
been decided in the London declaration, as is evidenced L~~~~ation or
by its text and the history of its origin. It was said
that opinion had been divided. It was stated that by
the French memoir neutral cargoes were not entitled to
claims for damages, because, "\Vhen the captor, for military reasons, holds the destruction of the prize to be necessary,
such a situation presents a military· measure; while, on
the other hand, the English memoir adn1its the claim,
provided the case does not involve contraband, because
a permissible cargo on board an ene1ny ship is not subject
to seizure. The question forn1ulated as a guide for the
preliminary discussion:
In view of the principle that neutral merchandise :eg~ral merunder enemy flag is not subject to seizure, "\Vill the owner c an Ise.
of the merchandise, in case of the destruction of the ship,
have to be indemnified, or is, in such case, the destruction
of a ship a military action "\vhich does not obligate the
belligerent to make indemnification~
had been discussed without bringing about an understanding. The prize court observed that during these
negotiations the question mainly dealt \Vith 'vas the
admissibility of the destruction of neutral ships, subject
to seizure. Confining herself to this particular matter,
Germany had expressed herself in favor of compensation
for neutral goods not subject to seizure. Japan alone had
declared herself \vith regard to the matter of neutral mer-
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chandise on an enemy ship which \Vas destroyed, and that
uJ~dem:nifica in the sense of England. Nothing indicated that, as
matters stood, Germany had meant to establish in the
prize regulations a principle to the effect that when an
enemy shizJ was destroyed, the neutral cargo \Vas entitled
to a claim for indemnification. In this sense at most an
argument could be deduced from article 114 of the prize
regulations, in so far as it \Vas here presupposed that in
destroying any ship compensation must be made for the
incidental destruction of that part of the cargo not subject to seizure. The argument was considered, ho\vever,
not sufficiently conclusive. It might readily be as~umed
that article 114 referred only to the destruction of neutral
ships, in view of the fact that the preceding and the follo,ving provision of the prize regulations dealt only with
such case.
'fhis vic"\v must, in effect, be approved.
Ger~an~ prize
The c1uestion to be settled is as to whether or not in
regulatiOns.
case an enemy ship is lawfully destroyed, compens3,tion
must be made for neutrt"tl merchandise on board such
ship which is destroyed at the same time. It is clear
that neither the prize regulations nor the London
declaration, contains an express prescription in regard
· to this matter.
Nor has the prize regulation indirectly provided for the settlement of that matter. The
plaintiff believes that such a provision is found in No.
114 of the prize regulations. The judge of first instance
has justly denied this, although \Ve ca.n not absolutely
agree with him in all the reasons he gives anent this
matter. In the article referred to the commander is
directed, before proceeding with the destruction of a ship,
to see if the loss thereby accruing to the enemy is equivalent to the compensation for damages "\vhich must be
paid for that part of the cargo not subject to seizure
\vhich is destroyed at the same time.
Destruction.
In connection with this~ reference is made, between
brackets, among other things to article 18 which deals
with the seizure of enemy ships and states \vhich part of
the cargo is, at the same time, subject to seizure. This
in effect, looks as though the author of the prize regulations had, when dealing with article 114, thought that
in the case of the destruction of an enemy ship compensation must be made for the part of the cargo not subject
to seizure; it rnust also be admitted that the said reference is opposed to the course of reasoning follo,ved by
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the first instance \vhen it assumes that article 114, even
as the preceding and the follo\ving provision, dealt only
with the destruction of neutral ships. In spite of that,
ho\vever, the provision can not be given such scope of interpretation as that with which the plaintiffs meant to
endow it. If it 'Nere so understood, it \vould come into a
certain material contradiction with that \Vhich the prize
regulation prescribes in the immediately connecting article. ...~s can be clearly seen from this, the prize regulation does not hold that, in every case compensation must
be made for the destruction of merchandise not subject to
seizure. In the case of the lavvful destruction of a neutral ship, compensation is prescribed for the merchandise,
not subject to seizure, destroyed along with the ship, in
so far as this concerns neutral merchandise, but not in regard to enemy merchandise, although likewise not subject
to seizure, under the protection of the neutral flag. We
must, furthermore, bear in mind that there are also enemy
ships that are not subject to seizure, and, therefore, not
subject to destruction, so that, even although at some
time-· possibly by reason of a pardonable error-the destruction took place, it may yet be asked, \Vhether or not a
distinction should be dra\vn in regard to compensation
for values destroyed along \vith the ship, between neutral
and enemy merchandise, and for this reason it might
have seemed advisable to direct the comm.anders of
vessels, for such eventualities, to make the inquiry incumbent upon them according to article 114. But it is
above all important to remember that article 114 is not
sedes rnateriae and that, therefore, even assuming that
the author of the law thought that even in case of the
lawful destruction of an enemy ship claims for compensation could be pres en ted in behalf of the merchandise of
neutrals, it would be wrong to find therein a positive
decision of this at least doubtful, and at all events very
controverted question which, Rlthough discussed at the
London Conference, was left open.
As Wehberg points out in Oesterreich. Zeitschrift fur
offentliches Recht, Tome II, 3, page 282, I-Ieilfron, Jur.
Wochenschrift, 1915, page 486, goes too far Vv~hen he
attributes to the prize regulations only the importance
of an order promulgated by the Emperor to the naval
authorities. The prize regulations contain, to a large
extent, positive law. But, 'vith regard to the provision
now under consideration, Heilfron's characterization fits
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perfectly. This article 114 is, in effect, but an order to
the con1manders of ships. Through it only the war lord
speaks, and not the legislator. It is not its purpose to
establish material right and it does not do so.
Law or warfare.
If, therefore, 've are compelled to consider the most
general principles of law in connection 'vith the rules of
the general law of warfare, it is found 'vith absolute certainty that neutrals are not entitled to present a claim
in case the destruction of the prize 'vas, in the circumstances, justified (art. 112 of the prize regulations). The
bringing to and the capture of the enemy ship is a
lawful war 1neasure against the foreign State, approved
in internationalla,v-. Claims for damages, either on the
part of the nationals of enemy States or on the part of
neutrals can not in all such cases be upheld. To be sure,
according to article 3 of the Paris declaration, neutral
1nerchandise (that is not contraband) is not subject to •
capture even on board an enemy ship. It is, therefore,
Damages.
not subject to seizure in case the prize is taken to port.
But there is no suggestion that the parties interested in
the cargo are entitled to present claims for compensation
for damages that have arisen as a result of the ship being
taken to port, of an interruption in the trip or the taking
of the ship to another than the point of destination. Nor
is it legitimate to present a claim for co1npensation in
case the merchandise itself, as a result of the seizure of
the ship, has sustained damage, nor, for instance, if on
the further journey of the prize it is lost as a result of
an accident at sea. Since the seizure is a lawful act,
there is no legal principle on which a claim may be presented for the damage which the neutral has rather
caused himself by intrusting his 1nerchandise to a ship
exposed to danger. Therefore, the war measure being
lawful, there is no legal ground on which a claim for
damages 1nay be based in case the merchandise is lost
because the 'var operation directed against the ship 'vas,
according to the circun1stances, necesssarily directed
against her cargo as 'veiL
The legal question that is important in this 1natter may
arise even in the course of 'varfnre on land. Conditions
may be such and very frequently 'vill be found to be
such that, for instance, while bo1nbarding a fortified or
defended place, the property of neutrals is damaged.
But even in warfare on land where priva.te property is
protected to a greater extent than in naval "rarfare, there
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is no question of a duty on the part of the belligerent
State, in such cases, to make compensation even to neutrals (art. 3 of the fourth convention of the Second
Hague Conference).
Compare Geffcken in Heffter, Volkerrecht, 8th edition, §150, note l
(incorrect, at least inadequate in that text of Heffter).
Calvo, Droit International, 4th edition, Vol. IV, §§ 2250-2252.
Bonfils, Droits des gens, 1908, § 1217.
Bordwell, Law of War, 1908, p. 212.

As regards the conditions of naval warfare in partie- P~r;.laration or
ular there is no protection either general or specific afforded to neutral merchandise by article 3 of the Paris declara-·
tion against the acts of the belligerent party resulting
from the circumstances of the war. Article 3 referred
to above is intended to afford protection against the prize
la.w to which, up to the time of the Paris declaration, neutral merchandise in theenemyship was exposed. Whatever
the circumstances of the war demand, 1nust be permitted
to take place without rega.rd to the fact that neutral merchandise is on board the ship. If, according to article
2 of the Paris declaration, the neutral flag protects enemy
merchandise, this does not mean that vice versa the enemy ship is to be protected by neutral merchandise, protected in the first place, perhaps only against destruction,
but by the same token in innumerable cases against any
exercise of the prize law.
As far as can be ascertained, no one has disputed this
even down to the most recent times .

.

Compare Resolutions of the French Conseil d'Etat, May 21, 1872.
Dalloz, Jurisprudence generale, 1871, III, No. 94, in the prize matter
Ludwig and Vorwiirts.
Dupuis, Le Droit de laguerre maritime, 1899, p. 334.
de Boeck, De la propriete ennemie privee sous pavillion ennemi,
1882, §146.
Bordwell, Law of War, 1908, p. 226.
Wheaton, International Law, 4th edition, p. 507, §359.
Oppenheim, International Law, second edition, Vol. II, p. 201 ff.
Calvo, Droit International, 4th edition, Vol. V, §§3033, 3034.
Hall, International Law, 5th edition, p. 717 ff.

The assertion of the plaintiffs that the decision of the cour
Frtendch. priz e
eCisions.
French prize court in the matter of the Ludwig and the
Vorwiirts had been almost unanimously attacked in the
literature, has, apart from the quotations adduced from
the most recent sources (Wehberg and Schramm; the
quotation from Hall, p. 187, see above, is incomprehensible), not been supported by documents, and must,
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therefore, be regarded as incorrect. Only in the most
recent times, especially in Germany, has there arisen
a conception of the theory \vhich postulates the obligation to 1nake compensation as a basic principle in all
cases of the destruction of 1nerchandise not subject to
seizure generally or only in so far as neutral merchandise is concerned.
Compare, Schramm, Prisenrecht, 1913, p. 338 ff.
\Vehberg, Seekriegerecht, 1915, p. 297, notes 3 and 4; and Oesterr.
Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht., cited elsewhere.
Rehm, Deutsche Juristenzeitung, 1915, p. 454.

In all these sources the general obligation for making
co1npensation in the above sense is unmistakably felt
to be something to be taken for granted. 'fhe foundation is lacking and \vhere it is subsequently sought to
establish one, it does not appear convincing when compared with the explanations given above. Nor can
anything be done against the conclusiveness of the latter
expositions by pointing out that warfare on land re1nains
locally circumscribed to the national territory of the
belligerents, while the ship sails the open seas. '_rhe
fact that an enemy ship on the high seas is subject to
seizure, and, if necessary, to attack, rests on the condition of international law as it exists, a condition which
is to be deplored, but which is, nevertheless, a condition
of fact. In all other respects, so soon as the ship is on
the high seas, she is a part of the territory of her State,
in which the neutral, by a voluntary act on his part,
has placed his rnerchandise, by lading it on a vessel
of a belligerent country for the purpose of transportation across the sea.
German
prize
I n cone1us1on,
·
· snou ld b e stated . t 11at It
· IS
· not a
regulations.
1t
defect of procedure \vhen, as is stated in the appeal,
the prize court has refrained fron1 deciding as to \vhether
or not the merchandise, to which the claims refer, was
subject to seizure. It is the object of section 1 of the
prize. court regulations clearly to define the prize jurisdiction, and even although in section 2 it is prescribed
to 'vhat the decision is to extend, this n1eans that thereby
a line has been dra\vn to which the courts 1nust confine
themselves; but nowhere is it prescribed that in any
particular case a decision n1ust be handed down 'vith
regard to the said questions even when the settlernent of
the claims presented docs not depend thereon.
1
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Notwithstanding the summons issued under 9 and 12,
the plaintiffs have not deposited the amount necessary
to cover expenses. Their legal remedy was, therefore,
not to be dealt Tl'vith.
THE "DACIA"
1:apeur capture en mer le 2'7 fevrier .1915 par le croiseur nuxil?:aire Europe. 20
CONSEIL DES PRISES.
Decision des 3 et 5 aout 1915.
[HH6J Decisions du Conseil des Prises, 180.

Au NOM nu PEUPLE FRANQAis,
Le Conseil des Prises a rendu la decision suivante, entre:
D'une part, Edward Brei tung, domicilie a Marquette
(Michigan, Etats-Unis), se disant proprietaire du vapeur
Dacia, capture en merle 27 fevrier 1915, a l'entree de la
~Ianche, par le croiseur auxiliaire fran9ais Europe,
ensemble le capitaine dudit vapeur, et le Ministre de la
Marine agissant pour le compte des capteurs et de la
Caisse des Invalides de la Marine.
D'aU:tre part, vu les lettres et bordereaux du 1finistre
de la Marine des 30 mars, 29 avril, 15 juillet et 26 juillet
1915, enregistres au Conseil les 29 avril, 16 et 29 juillet
1915, portant envoi du dossier concernant la capture du
vapeur Dacia et concluant a ce qu'il plaise au Conseil
declarer bonne et valable la capture du Dacia et de tous
ses accessoires, parmi lesquels les approvisionnements de
bord de toute nature, y compris les vivres sans exception,
trouves sur le navire, merne ceux reclames con1me
propriete personnelle par le capitaine MacDonald, en
dehors des papier.s de bord;
Vu les documents constituant ledit dossier, et notanlment:
1o Le proces-verbal de capture dresse en mer le 27
fevrier 1915;
2° Les papiers de bord, parmi lesquels un acte en date
a New-York du 17 decembre 1914, par lequel la Compagnie I-Ianiburg-.A.merika declare vendre le Dacia a
Edward N. Breitung, et un affidavit du 19 decembre 1914
dudit Breitung declarant cette vente sincere et sans
reticences; l'acte d'enregistrement americain dudit Dacia
a Port-Arthur (Texas), le 4 janvier 1915; le manifeste de
:9

Decision inseree dans le Journal officiel du 28 septembre 1915.

Documents.

